Eesti keeles
flickr

Baltic Defence Line

In accordance with the NATO Madrid Summit decision to opt for a modern Forward Defence posture and deterrence by denial the Baltic defence ministers have agreed to build anti-mobility defensive installations on the border of all three countries. This approach is being implemented through NATO’s new regional plans and relevant national plans with the aim of defending every inch of Allied territory at all times.

  • Planning and preparation of the permanent fortifications and anti-mobility installations is one of the most effective ways in making modern Forward Defence a reality on our eastern borders.
  • These installations serve the purpose of avoiding the military conflict in our region as they could potentially change the enemy´s calculus.
  • Each country is responsible for conducting the process in accordance with their national regulations, but it is important that we share the common goal making our borders safer also in military sense.

The war in Ukraine has shown that taking back already conquered territories is extremely difficult and comes at great cost of human lives, time and material resources. In addition to equipment, ammunition and manpower we need physical installations to defend our countries efficiently.

  • We have seen different estimates how quickly Russia can rebuild its military, we need to use this time wisely – the time to make all the necessary preparations is now.
  • Counter-mobility and fortification measures have played a significant role in wars in our region in history (Finland) and as the war in Ukraine as demonstrated, are perfectly valid also in 21-st century.
  • The need for Defence Line is shared among the allies in the Baltic Sea region incl. Poland, but we also see potential for cooperation with northern allies, especially Finland. The need for a defence line stems from the security situation and supports NATO’s new forward defence concept. At the same time Baltic Defence Line strengthens the security of the European Union and the military defence of its borders, which is why we clearly see that the European Union could also financially support the project.

The installations should deny enemy the possibility to advance rapidly in the territory of Baltic countries and in case of military incursion stop the enemy’s advance already at our borders.

  • It makes every sense for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to coordinate building these installations to avoid leaving loopholes.
  • The security situation in our region does not show any signs of improvement, hence it is critical to start preparing as soon as possible.
  • In practical terms, in Estonia we are talking about planning a number of strongholds, including bunkers (approx. 600) and different counter-mobility measures, but also number of storage areas for the non-explosive ordnance and other counter-mobility equipment. As much as possible we also seek to use the natural obstacles in Northeast and Southeast of Estonia. No placement of explosive ordnance on the border is planned in Estonia during peacetime.
  • The planning process is underway this year and construction is scheduled to start next year.

Schedule:

  • The defence ministers of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania confirmed the concept of the Baltic Defence Line on January 19, 2024.
  • The design of the defence line elements (squad shelter/bunker, barrier elements) will occur in the second half of 2024.
  • Public meetings with local communities took place in March 2024. Events that introduced the defence line:
  • March 14, 2024, at 18:00 in the Räpina
  • March 21, 2024, at 18:00 in the Misso Community House
  • March 22, 2024, at 18:00 in the Meremäe municipal service building
  • March 25, 2024, at 17:00 in the Värska Culture House
  • March 26, 2024, at 17:00 in the Vastseliina Community House
  • The Estonian Centre for Defence Investments (ECDI) signed a contract with Warren Concrete OÜ in July 2024 for the production of various bunker prototypes. The bunkers will be made of concrete.
  • The 3 bunker prototypes were tested at the Central training are with the Defence Forces in October 2024. If the engineering solution is successful, an open tender will be issued for the production of 600 standard bunkers.
  • On October 10th, the Estonian Defence Forces and the Estonian Centre for Defence Investment tested three different types of concrete bunker prototypes at the Central Training Area. The bunkers were subjected to 155-millimeter artillery shell blasts. Reports from the tests will be completed over the next three weeks, after which conclusions can be drawn how to plan a mass production. Representatives from the defense forces of Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland also participated in the testing.
  • The locations of the strongholds will be determined by the end of 2024.
  • We prefer state land for the locations of the strongholds, but if private land use is under consideration, negotiations with landowners will begin in early 2025.
  • Construction activities, along with preparatory actions, will commence in 2025.

Does the ministry have a decision of what the fortifications will be on the Estonia-Russia border?

In Estonia’s case, the Baltic Defence Line is a complex measure of deterrence and fortification, including:

  • Defence strongpoints (including up to 600 bunkers for Defence Forces and Defence League units);
  • Storage areas (for the peacetime storage of fortification elements, including pyramidal anti-tank obstacles so called dragon teeth” and the “cutting wire” to be deployed to the bases in the event of a military threat).

The composition of a peacetime stronghold includes:

  • Concrete bunkers
  • Construction equipment container
  • Dragon’s teeth
  • Barbed wire
  • Tripwire

The roads, woods, fields, and other structures within the fortifications will remain largely usable and passable as they are.

Defensive installations will be dispersed across the landscape, taking into account the potential activities of the enemy and the results of the environmental analysis, as well as the battle plan of the Defence Forces units and local capabilities, and agreements reached with landowners.

Locations:

  • Defence line elements will be installed and stored in Northeast and Southeast Estonia.
  • The Estonian Centre for Defence Investments (ECDI) handles the search for storage areas and coordination with landowners. In determining these locations, the general geography of the defence line and the need to ensure rapid access to supplies from nearby locations are considered.
  • The locations of the strongholds will be determined in cooperation with the Estonian Defence Forces, and ECDI will handle communications with landowners affected by the strongholds.

Will the fortifications only cover the land part of the border?

Yes.

How much will the project cost?

Project costs up to €60 million.

When will the construction begin, and when will the fortifications be completed? Has the process of getting landowners permits begun?

We prefer state land for the locations of the strongholds, but if private land use is under consideration, negotiations with landowners will begin in early 2025.

Construction activities, along with preparatory actions, will commence in 2025.

What would be the role for the 600 bunkers, described by the Estonian ministry in January: are they a storage, base location, or a fortified premise for troops to hold ground against enemy forces

The purpose of them is for troops to maintain position.

When completed, the bunkers will look more like country cellars, blending in quite well with the local landscape. There will be about 15 ‘country cellars’ per base, spread over an area of about one square kilometre. The bunkers are about the size of a living room, i.e. about 35 m2 , and have to accommodate a unit that is 10 soldiers.

What will be its impact – what attack would it be able to withstand?

The Baltic Defence Line is by its nature a complex of interdiction and fortification measures, the elements of which in the terrain support the activities of defending units at their bases, in order to stop an attack by aggressor units if necessary.

They aid in protecting our troops from missile fire in the event of an indirect fire attack.

How much does one bunker cost?

It depends on the weight and the type of reinforced concrete elements we use to produce these bunkers. To put it simply, if we were to produce the entire bunker at once, we would be transporting air, since they are hollow inside – there needs to be room for all the equipment and people. However, if we can cast these from elements, then we are transporting a definite mass, and the transportation, handling, and storage of bunkers into an intermediate warehouse become more space-efficient, resulting in cost savings.

If bunkers cannot be installed on a particular property, how are they planned to be deployed to defensive positions when needed?

The ease of handling the bunker kit (an infantry company can transport and install it using their means) is one of the key requirements that infantry have presented to the bunker designers. We need to find a balance between weight and ease of installation, strength, and perhaps some other critical criteria. From the military’s perspective, the weight should not exceed a limit where special machinery, not available to the military or widely in the civilian sector, is required to move these elements. Bunkers and/or their modules weighing up to 10 tons are manageable for the military. The current plan is ideally to have the bunkers installed before the infantry has to start doing it manually in a crisis scenario.

If asked on Ottawa Convention and anti-personnel mines:

  • Estonian Defence Forces do not use or plan to use Ottawa Convention prohibited anti-personnel mines with the characteristic feature of which is that the mine explodes regardless of whether it is detonated by an enemy soldier, own troops, civilian, wild or domestic animal.
  • However, Estonian Defence Forces continues to use anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines and protective charges permitted by the Ottawa and other conventions, where the explosion is clearly initiated by a person, i.e. it is set to explode when enemy troops or vehicles are within its range. This ensures that the mines and charges used by Estonia in defence activities do not mistakenly harm Estonia’s own or Allied troops, civilians, etc.
  • The use of such mines has long been part of the engineer activities of the Estonian Defence Forces, and they also play an important role in the creation of Baltic Defence Line.

Is Estonia preparing for war?

The construction of the defense line is part of the development of Estonia’s defense capabilities, aimed at strengthening and protecting Estonia. We are preparing to defend ourselves. Establishing a defense line along the eastern border is not new; it has been done in the past as well.